Explaining Honesty: A cooperative approach

[Excerpt from an unfunded grant application.]

Introduction

Honesty is one of the most frequently observed and highly regarded moral virtues [1, 2]. But what is honesty? Why is it such an important moral virtue? And when is it permissible to lie?

Previous research suggests that morality is a collection of cooperative rules [3]. There are many types of cooperation, hence there are many types of morality, including: love of family, group loyalty, reciprocity, bravery, respect, fairness and property rights [4]. These morals appear to be evolutionarily ancient, genetically distinct, psychometrically distinguishable, and culturally universal [5, 6]. Further, the theory argues that it will always be morally good to behave in these ways, unless doing so interferes with some other more valuable cooperative opportunity [7].

Here I suggest how this cooperative approach to morality might be applied to honesty.

Communication as Cooperation

Honesty is best understood as the cooperative exchange of information. This explains why telling the truth is not merely an epistemic or prudential virtue but a moral virtue; why there are different types of honesty and dishonesty; and why it is sometimes permissible, even morally preferable, to lie.

First, according to signalling theory, all communication is cooperative: senders benefit from sending information, and receivers benefit from receiving it [8]. (If they didn’t, then they wouldn’t.) And communication is undermined by uncooperative individuals who disrupt or exploit the system by sending false information [9]. Human language is no exception: it relies implicitly on “the cooperative principle” of providing true information; violations of this principle lead to the breakdown of communication [10]. Thus, if morality is a collection of cooperative rules, and cooperating is considered morally good; and if telling the truth is cooperative; then this would explain why telling the truth is considered morally good (and lying is considered morally bad). And the sheer quantity and import of information conveyed by human discourse explains why honesty – and a reputation for honesty – is such a highly valued moral virtue [11-15].

Second, this cooperative theory also leads us to expect that, because different types of cooperation involve the transfer of different types of information, there will be different types of honesty and dishonesty. For example, conventional signals are used to help groups coordinate to mutual advantage [16]; these conventions are undermined, and the mutual benefit is lost, when deviants raise false alarms by ‘crying wolf’. Social exchange is facilitated in part by the promise to reciprocate favours; such schemes are undermined, trust is destroyed, by individuals who make ‘false promises’, and thus cheat. Conflicts can be resolved by displaying costly signals of power and prestige that deter aggression [17]; such schemes are destabilised by individuals who make ‘empty boasts’. Thus the theory gives us a principled ‘taxonomy of truth’; and we should expect there to be as many types of honesty (and dishonesty) as there are types of cooperation (Table 1).

Third, the cooperative theory predicts that telling the truth will always be considered morally good, except when doing so undermines some other more valuable cooperative opportunity, in which case it will be good to lie. And, because there is more than one type of honesty (and dishonesty), there will be more than one type of ‘white lie’ – there may be an entire rainbow. For example, rather than impart the unvarnished truth, parents might lie to their children in order to protect them. Some factually correct statements may be considered heretical and invite sanction, whereas mouthing convenient fictions can signal loyalty and bolster in-group solidarity [18]. And ’speaking truth to power’ can come across as impertinent and disrespectful – indirect speech, that allows the recipient to 'save face’, might be necessary to impart the information [19].

Together, this approach suggests that because ‘honesty’ – the transfer of true information – is an integral part of existing, well understood aspects of cooperation, it is explained by existing evolutionary cooperative theories of morality. It is not some anomalous, distinct form of morality that would require, for example, its own foundation [20].

#	Moral	Honesty	Dishonesty	‘White Lies’
1	Family	Greenbeards	Imposters	'What do we tell the children?''
2	Group	Rallying cries, badges of membership	Crying wolf	‘Blue lies’, heresy, ‘I’m Spartacus’
3	Reciprocity	Promises	False promises	Thanks for unwanted gifts, noble lies
4	Heroism	Costly signals (eg medals)	Empty boasts	‘Yellow lies’, saving face, arcania
5	Deference	Submission cues, etiquette	Trojan Horse	Truth to power, flattery
6	Fairness	Credentials	Embellishing CV	Blind auditions
7	Property	Copyrights, patents	Plaigarism	???

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